



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MAR 23 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Civilian Personnel Ceilings

Reference your draft letter ^{7,} to Director Lance concerning OMB Bulletin No. 77-7.

As Secretary Brown noted in his letter to you of 18 March, he intends to respond directly to OMB with respect to the entire DoD civilian manpower ceiling. We will keep you informed of the extent those discussions lead to reductions which impact on DoD manpower ceilings in the intelligence area.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Charles W. Duncan, Jr.", is positioned above the printed name.

Charles W. Duncan, Jr.


Executive Registry
11-3859

23 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI
D/DCI/IC

FROM: Executive Assistant to DCI

Admiral Turner asked to forward the attached memorandum to you. He asked that it not be distributed as a whole. However, information you feel appropriate may be taken out and passed on for information.



Commander, U.S. Navy

STAT

Att.

Defense

SECRET

Executive Registry

77-3859/1

23 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussions with Secretary Brown and Secretary Duncan
18 March 1977

1. Secretary Brown agreed he would look at our proposed letter to exempt the Intelligence Community from the manpower cut. He has considerable problems with it, however. He also thinks it will make the new Intelligence Community Staff look as though it is not being very objective in its early days.

2. We discussed the proper procedures for coordinating the joint interests of the DCI and the SecDef. We divided this into two problems as to how tasking would be controlled:

a. Of operational assets that are primarily "national": It was agreed that this kind of tasking is best done by committees with the DCI having the ultimate authority for decisions that have to be made on an urgent basis; where the DCI and SecDef negotiating long-range issues.



25X1

3. We further talked about the difficulty in defining national and tactical intelligence assets.

a. We generally agreed that it might be worth exploring a division in this area on the basis of who controls an asset, although this is an imperfect solution that may be better than what the sensor is on the asset. I pointed out my opinion that an asset which had both tactical and national capabilities could be handled by a prior allocation of a certain amount of time on the assets to tactical commanders.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800100016-8

Hopefully, this would ultimately result in the commander in the field actually exercising direct control of the asset when it was operating in his area.

b. We also discussed the issue of transition from peace to war. We agreed first that those were not the proper terms, but perhaps something more like "the balance of importance." When the balance of the importance of intelligence began to shift from national acquisition to military tactical acquisition, the chairmanship of the committee mentioned above making ultimate decisions on the tasking of operational assets would simply change from the DCI to the SecDef, thus the basic structure that was making the decisions would remain in tact, and only the ultimate deciding authority would change.

25X1



SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001800100016-8

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI				
3	D/DCI/IC	✓			
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	Asst/DCI				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20	D/EE0				
21					
22					

SUSPENSE _____
 Date _____

Remarks:

D/Executive Secretary
 25 MAR 77
 Date

3637 (7-76)

25X1

25X1